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I. Introduction 
International trade and investment arbitration are distinct disciplines within the field 
of international economic law. Practitioners and scholars in one field rarely labor in the 
vineyards of the other. Yet the trade and investment arbitration regimes routinely 
overlap and are increasingly converging. They promote similar objectives—globalization, 
economic integration, trade promotion, and investment protection. They are often 
embedded in the same treaties, such as part of preferential trade agreements. They 
incorporate similar substantive protections, particularly the rules against discrimination 
and protectionism. They both use international tribunals as the vehicle for dispute 
settlement, thereby allowing for judicial review of sovereign state violations of 
international law. As of late, they both use the economic leverage of tariff benefits to 
secure compliance with adverse judicial decisions. They both are on the ascendance, with 
countries clamoring to reap the rewards of membership in each club. 
There are, of course, numerous differences between the trade and investment regimes 
worthy of examination. In many respects, the two disciplines are distinct, and it is 
therefore little surprise that the academy and the bar do not treat them as a single legal 
order. However, for purposes of this paper, I wish to focus on the overlap and convergence 
between the trade and investment regimes. 
Part I of this paper addresses will address the trend toward incorporating investment 
arbitration chapters in preferential trade agreements, thus reflecting the need for deeper 
forms of legal protection in response to the changing nature of international trade, 
particularly the intra-firm globalized chains of supply. Corporate outsourcing of 
production generates tremendous demand for lower trade costs and enhanced investment 
protections. Part II concerns the converging commitments in trade and investment 
arbitration against protectionism and discrimination. Although the national treatment 
tests embodied in the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements differ from that in 
most bilateral investment treaties (BITs), both regimes are concerned with establishing 
rules to effectively regulate different forms of de facto or de jure discrimination. The other 
points of convergence focus on various aspects of dispute settlement. Part III discusses 
the trend toward parallel WTO and BIT proceedings, which is only possible through the 
convergence of substantive norms. This convergence encourages a foreign investor, who is 
independently pursuing a BIT claim to contemporaneously persuade its home 
government to diplomatically espouse a WTO claim. Part IV addresses the use of trade 
remedies to enforce arbitration awards. This has occurred when a developed country 
(such as the United States) threatens to remove preferential trade benefits to a 
developing country (such as Argentina) if the developing country does not honor its 
international arbitration commitments. Part V addresses the emerging trend of relying 
on investment arbitration to enforce international trade rights. Despite the assumption 
that international trade disputes must be resolved before the WTO Dispute Settlement 
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Body, the existence of broad umbrella clauses in BITs presents an emerging vehicle for 
enforcing investment commitments in trade agreements. 
II.  Investment Chapters and Preferential Trade Agreements 
The most obvious point of convergence between international trade and arbitration is 
evident in the increasingly common practice of combining trade and investment 
arbitration in a single treaty. The most frequent manifestation of this trend is in the 
investment chapters embedded in preferential trade agreements (PTAs).1 Most 
scholarship on investment arbitration focuses on BITs, and diminishes the importance of 
investment chapters in PTAs.2 This is despite the fact that the number of BITs is on the 
decline and the number of PTAs with investment chapters is on the rise.3 A characteristic 
feature of PTAs is that they “combine foreign direct investment . . . and trade to create 
global supply chains that maximize productivity through the distribution of production 
among a number of countries.”4 
In a recent study on PTAs, 587 agreements between 3310 countries, dating from 1945 
to 2009, were coded based on their content.5 Of these PTAs, 37% (217 agreements) 
included investment provisions and 13% (76 agreements) included an investor-host State 
dispute settlement mechanism.6 The study distinguished between “shallow” and “deep” 
PTAs, with the latter including measures “that do not directly concern trade—such as 
those protecting investments and intellectual property rights and those opening 
government procurement to foreign bidders.”7 According to the study, the positive trade 
effects of deep PTAs “substantially outperform” baseline GATT/WTO trade 
relationships.8  Moreover, “the deeper a PTA, the larger is its effect on trade flows 
between member countries.”9 
Why would countries sign deep PTAs with investment chapters instead of simply 
relying on shallow PTAs, the WTO, or BITs? The answer depends on the nature of the 
trading relationship. PTAs with investment chapters are positively and significantly 
 
1. See infra notes 5-9 and accompanying text. 
2. See, e.g., KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES:  HISTORY, POLICY, AND 
INTERPRETATION (2010); RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, ICSID, BILATERAL INVESTMENT 
TREATIES (1995). 
3. Sébastien Miroudot, Investment, in PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENT POLICIES FOR 
DEVELOPMENT:  A HANDBOOK, 307, 308 fig.14.1 (Jean-Pierre Chauffour & Jean-Christoph Maur, 
eds., 2011).  
4. Id.  
5. Andreas Dür, Leonardo Baccini, Manfred Elsig, & Karolina Milewicz, The Design of International 
Trade Agreements: Introducing a New Database, 1, 6 (2012) available at 
https://www.dvpw.de/fileadmin/docs/Kongress2012/Paperroom/2012IB-Duer.pdf.  
6. Id. at 11 fig.4. 
7. Id. at 30. 
8. Id. at 23 tbl.3. 
9. Id. at 19. 
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correlated with intra-firm trade and vertical foreign direct investment.10 “Intra-firm 
trade” occurs as a result of globalized outsourcing, that is, when the components of a final 
product are produced or assembled by affiliated companies in two or more countries and 
exported back to the home country.11    
“[C]ountries are more likely to sign” deep PTAs “when intra firm trade is at the higher 
ends of the value-added chain.”12 Moreover, intra-firm trade is negatively correlated with 
BITs and shallow PTAs.13 In other words, vertical foreign direct investment resulting 
from globalized supply chains increases the demand for investment chapters in PTAs. 
The data indicates that when compared to BITs and shallow PTAs, deep PTAs with 
investment chapters are generally signed when countries are wealthier and when intra-
firm trade is at the higher ends of the value-added chain.14 In short, deep PTAs are 
particularly desirable when trade is between rich countries and relates to vertically-
integrated production methods that require large capital investments.    
According to a WTO study conducted in 2011, following the signing of deep PTAs, 
trade in production networks between member countries increased by almost 35%.15 
Deep PTAs with investment chapters also have a greater impact on trade flows in some 
sectors than others. The same study calculated an increase in trade in the automotive 
parts and information and communication technology of 81 and 56%, respectively, as 
compared to only 20% in textiles.16 This suggests that capital-intensive industries that 
incorporate significant technological know-how and intellectual property are more 
responsive to deep PTAs.  
Deep PTAs with investment chapters mitigate the risks associated with trade and 
investment that are critical for successful global chains of supply. The preferential trade 
component of such agreements makes it comparatively cheaper for multinational 
corporations to secure supply chain inputs from the host country, while the investment 
protections protect against the political risks associated with large capital investments, 
 
10. Raymond Hicks & Kris Johnson, When a BIT Just Isn’t Enough: Why We See Investment Chapters 
in Preferential Trade Agreements 27 (2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); 
Jennifer L. Tobin & Marc L. Busch, A BIT is Better Than a Lot:  Bilateral Investment Treaties and 
Preferential Trade Agreements, 62 WORLD POLITICS, 1, 8 (2010) (“[V]ertical FDI be the main 
motivation for multi-nationals looking to invest in developing countries, and thus we should 
expect them to demand PTAs as well as BITs.”); Miroudot, supra note 3, at 307, 318 (“Vertical FDI 
is associated with efficiency-seeking strategies . . . . [A] PTA is likely to increase FDI through both 
its trade and its investment provisions.”). 
11. Hicks & Johnson, supra note 10, at 9. 
12. Hicks & Johnson, supra note 10, at 28. 
13. Hicks & Johnson, supra note 10, at 28. 
14. Hicks & Johnson, supra note 10, at 6, 28, 32-33. 
15. Gianluca Orefice & Nadia Rocha, Deep Integration and Production Networks:  An Empirical 
Analysis, 1, 4, 19 (July 2011), available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/ 
reser_e/ersd2011_e.pdf. 
16. Id. at 14, 19, 28 tbl.5. 
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such as expropriation, denial of justice, and discriminatory treatment, and other 
governmental misconduct. Further, deep PTAs respond to and reflect the needs of 
vertically-integrated, globalized, multinational corporations. Globalized production lines 
cannot operate smoothly unless national policies are harmonized. To this end, deep PTAs 
foster integration with respect to infrastructure, institutions, and product regulations, 
thus securing cross-border production.17 
BITs are effective at protecting foreign investors who seek access to the host State’s 
market. The WTO is effective at providing fundamental guarantees with respect to 
liberalized trade. The guarantees in BITs and the WTO, thus, are baseline protections 
that reflect international minimum standards that nations accord to every other trading 
partner. They embody an ‘Economic Bill of Rights’ of sorts for international relations, the 
least common denominator of normal trading relations.  
Deep PTAs with investment chapters, by contrast, are about special trading partners. 
They give access to an inner circle of rights that are reserved for privileged economic 
relationships. They seek to minimize trade costs, maximize market access, and 
harmonize cross-border regulatory standards. Fundamentally, deep PTAs are concerned 
with vertical integration and efficient global production lines. Thus, as intra-firm trade 
and global supply chains proliferate, so shall also PTAs with investment chapters. The 
deepening of international economic relations portends new types of trade and 
investment protections. The effective management of trade and investment risks is 
promoting the convergence of trade and investment arbitration. 
III. Convergence of Trade and Arbitration Norms 
In many respects, the international norms reflected in the WTO differ from those 
guaranteed in BITs. The WTO agreements are concerned with trade liberalization, while 
BITs are concerned with investment protection. Many WTO norms, such as those 
addressing tariffs, non-tariff barriers, and unilateral trade remedies have no corollary in 
BITs. Likewise, BIT protections against unlawful expropriation, denial of justice, and the 
guarantee of full protection and security have no corollary in the WTO agreements.     
However, a common denominator in both the trade and investment treaties is the 
norm against discrimination.18 Under the WTO’s national treatment obligation, “[t]he 
 
17. Id. at 2-3 (“In order for cross-border production to operate smoothly, certain national policies need 
to be harmonized to facilitate business activities taking place in several countries.  This generates 
a demand for deep forms of integration.  In other words, agreements that include disciplines such 
as infrastructure, institutions, competition policy, the standardization and harmonization of 
product regulations, amongst others, would make production sharing activities more secure and 
less likely to encounter disruptions or restrictions.”).   
18. If space permitted, one could also discuss convergence with respect to emergency exceptions.  
Although the non-self-judging economic emergency exceptions in BITs such as the United States-
Argentina Bilateral Investment Treaty are distinct from the WTO’s self-judging national security 
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products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other 
contracting party shall be accorded no less favourable treatment than that accorded to 
like products of national origin in respect to all laws, regulations, and requirements . . . 
.”19  BITs also include a similar national treatment obligation. The national treatment 
obligation embodied in the NAFTA, for example, provides that “[e]ach Party shall accord 
to investors of another Party treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like 
circumstances, to its own investors with respect to the establishment, acquisition, 
expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of 
investments.”20  
Arbitral tribunals interpreting the national treatment obligation in NAFTA have 
routinely considered WTO jurisprudence in resolving whether a foreign investor has been 
accorded no less favorable treatment than domestic investors in like circumstances.21 In 
SD Myers v. Canada, the tribunal noted that the WTO national treatment obligation 
must be read in context, and that context included general exceptions relating to 
environmental protection.22 It then construed NAFTA’s national treatment obligation—
which includes no express environmental exception—to be subject to the environmental 
 
exception, investment tribunals routinely have relied on WTO jurisprudence in interpreting BIT 
emergency exceptions. See, e.g., Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. AEB/03/9, Award, 
¶¶ 182-88 (Sept. 5, 2008); Enron Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award, ¶ 
331 (May 22, 2007); CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, 
Annulment Proceeding, ¶¶ 119-27 (Sept. 25, 2007); Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentina, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/02/16, Award, ¶¶ 379-83 (Sept. 28, 2007); LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, ¶¶ 212-13 (Oct. 3, 2006); CMS Gas Transmission 
Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, ¶¶ 370-73 (May 12, 2005); See 
generally Roger P. Alford, The Self-Judging WTO Security Exception, 3 UTAH L. REV. 697, 737-39 
& n.272 (2011); JÜrgen Kurtz, Adjudging the Exceptional at International Investment Law: 
Security, Public Order and Financial Crisis, 59 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 325, 339, 348–49 (2010); 
Andrea K. Bjorklund, Emergency Exceptions: State of Necessity and Force Majeure, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 459, 503–05 (Peter Muchlinski, 
Ferderico Ortino & Christoph Schreuer, eds., 2008).  Moreover, the latest version of the United 
States Model BIT mirrors in many respects the WTO security exception and could represent a 
type of convergence. Moreover, the latest version of the United States Model BIT mirrors in many 
respects the WTO security exception and could represent a type of convergence. Alford, supra note 
19, at 739; Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government 
[Country] Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, art. 18, 2004, 
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/117601.pdf [hereinafter U.S. Model 
BIT]. 
19. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. III(4), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187[ 
hereinafter GATT]. Similarly, GATT, art. III(1) imposes national treatment obligations with 
respect to internal taxes and other internal charges. 
20. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 1102(1), Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 
289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. NAFTA, art. 1102(2), includes similar national treatment 
language with respect to investments.    
21. For a detailed analysis of these cases, see Jürgen Kurtz, The Use and Abuse of WTO Law in 
Investor-State Arbitration: Competition and its Discontents, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 749 (2009). 
22. S.D. Myers v. Canada, NAFTA/UNICTRAL Trib., 1st Partial Award, ¶¶ 244-247 (Nov 13, 2000), 
http://naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Canada/Pope/PopeFinalMeritsAward.pdf. 
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policies that form part of NAFTA’s context.23  In Pope & Talbot v. Canada, the arbitral 
tribunal analyzed WTO jurisprudence and rejected the respondent State’s narrow 
definition of what constituted discriminatory treatment.24  In a third case, Occidental v. 
Ecuador, the arbitral tribunal compared the text of the national treatment provision in 
the BIT with the text of the national treatment provision in the WTO.25  The arbitral 
tribunal concluded that “like situations” were not the same as “like products”, and 
therefore the foreign investors receiving discriminatory treatment did not need to stand 
in a competitive relationship with the domestic companies receiving the preferential 
treatment. Finally, in Methanex v. United States, the arbitral tribunal painstakingly 
compared the WTO national treatment provisions with various provisions in NAFTA to 
conclude that “like circumstances” could not be interpreted to mean “like products.”26      
Whether or not these tribunals reached the correct result, the comparative analysis is 
worth emphasizing.  The leading investment cases interpreting the meaning of national 
treatment presumed the relevance of WTO jurisprudence. “Like products” in GATT is 
evidently not the same question as whether foreign and domestic investors are in “like 
circumstances.” Nevertheless, the pull toward reliance on the WTO as persuasive 
authority appears almost irresistible.27 
Of course, “like circumstances” are not “like investors.”  A “like circumstance” is a 
state of affairs, a condition or factor influencing an investor’s regulatory experience.28  
The question is not the indicia of investor likeness, but rather on whether there are “any 
legitimate reason to distinguish between the foreign and domestic investments in the 
specific circumstances surrounding [the government regulation].”29  Despite the fact that 
the WTO has a different text, different object and purpose, different context, different 
 
23. Id. ¶ 247. 
24. Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada, NAFTA/UNICTRAL Trib., Award on Merits, ¶¶ 45-72 (Apr. 10, 
2001), http://naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Canada/Pope/PopeFinalMeritsAward.pdf. 
25. Occidental Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN3467, Award, ¶¶ 
173-177 (London Ct. Int'l Arb. 2004). 
26. Methanex Corp. v. United States, NAFTA/UNICTRAL Trib., Final Award, ¶¶ 29-38 (Aug. 3, 
2005), 44 I.L.M. 1345, 1446-1449,), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/ 
51052.pdf.   
27. I say “almost” because on occasion investment tribunals resolve national treatment claims with no 
apparent concern for the WTO analogy. See, e.g., United Parcel Service of America, Inc. v. Canada, 
NAFTA/UNICTRAL Trib., Award on the Merits, ¶¶ 80-119 (May 24, 2007).  In his dissent in UPS 
v. Canada, Arbitrator Ronald Cass argued that “[t]he wording of Article 1102 suggests a very close 
parallel to the national treatment obligations contained in the GATT and the GATS, as well as 
other international trade and investment agreements and treaties. . . [Article 1102] commands an 
effective parity of foreign and domestic investors and investments . . . a reading [that] is consistent 
. . . with precedent under GATT and WTO.”  See id. ¶¶ 57-61 (Separate Statement of Dean Ronald 
A. Cass).   
28. Nicholas DiMascio & Joost Pauwelyn, Nondiscrimination in Trade and Investment Treaties: 
Worlds Apart or Two Sides of the Same Coin?, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 48, 85 (2008). 
29. Id. 
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institutional framework, and a different remedy, arbitral tribunals cannot avoid the 
WTO comparison. 
The choice of a WTO analogy only adds to the confusion. The national treatment 
standard in GATS is a closer analogy than that in GATT, requiring each Member to 
“accord to services and service suppliers of any other Member, in respect of all measures 
affecting the supply of services, treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its 
own like services and service suppliers.”30 This test presumes a competitive relationship 
between foreign and domestic services, but at least is not burdened with the irrelevant 
qualitative assessments of “like products” in WTO jurisprudence, much less the 
nettlesome distinction between “like products” and “directly competitive or substitutable 
products.”31  
An even better WTO analog than GATS would be TRIPS.  Article 3 of TRIPs states 
that “[e]ach Member shall accord to the nationals of other Members treatment no less 
favourable than it accords to its own nationals with regard to the protection of 
intellectual property.”32 Like the BIT standard, there is no suggestion in TRIPs that 
foreign and domestic nationals stand in a competitive relationship. The concern, rather, 
is about equality of treatment as between domestic and foreign nationals with respect to 
the regulation and protection of intellectual property rights.33       
So why do investment tribunals continue to grasp for inapposite analogies from the 
existing WTO jurisprudence?  Perhaps it is because WTO law is seen as “any relevant 
rule of international law applicable in the relation between the parties.”34  On this 
theory, the WTO is part of the larger BIT context, and one cannot interpret the national 
 
30. See General Agreement on Trade in Services, art. XVII, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter “GATS”]. 
31. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, art. III:1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter GATT]. 
32. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 3, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 
(1995) [hereinafter TRIPs]. 
33. Another analogy is Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, which 
provides that “Members shall ensure that in respect of technical regulations, products 
imported from the territory of any Member shall be accorded treatment no less favourable 
than that accorded to like products of national origin . . . ” Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade art. 2.1, Apr. 15, 1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120.  See United States-Measures Affecting the 
Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, WT/DS406/AB/R, ¶¶ 116-119 (Apr. 24, 2012).  Similar 
to the national treatment standard in BITs, the TBT’s national treatment standard is not 
subject to a general exception.  See Joost Pauwelyn, What Does Clove Cigarettes Mean for 
Discrimination Under GATT and Investment Treaties, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW AND 
POLICY BLOG (Sept. 14, 2011), http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2011/09/what-does-
cloves-cigarettes-mean-for-discrimination-under-gatt-and-investment-treaties.html.  
34. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3)(c), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (the 
treaty interpreter shall take into account “any relevant rules of international law applicable in 
the relations between the parties.”); see generally Gaetan Verhoosel, The Use of Investor-State 
Arbitration Under Bilateral Investment Treaties to Seek Relief for Breaches of WTO Law, 6 J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 493, 503-04 (2003). 
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treatment standard in BITs without taking into consideration how the WTO has 
interpreted its own national treatment standards. 
Or perhaps it is because both trade and investment tribunals are struggling with the 
same core issue of designing a “national treatment test that eliminates discrimination 
against foreigners without encroaching too far upon domestic regulatory sovereignty.”35  
In both cases the concern is about establishing rules to regulate de facto or de jure 
protectionism or disparate treatment. Accordingly, key insights may be drawn across the 
regimes in light of the common and unifying purpose of fashioning a national treatment 
test.  Comparative analysis of the national treatment standard is in search of a “cohesive 
international economic law.”36 
IV. Parallel Proceedings 
The convergence of substantive norms gives occasion for the same government 
measure to generate parallel trade and investment proceedings.  Foreign investors by 
definition are engaged in the international trade of goods and services.  When they are 
adversely affected by a government measure, they will consider all relevant avenues of 
dispute resolution. Occasionally both investment arbitration and WTO dispute 
settlement are viable options. This allows a multinational corporation to convince its 
home government to diplomatically espouse a WTO claim while it pursues in its own 
right a BIT claim.  
As a matter of substantive right, the same set of facts may trigger both investment 
and trade claims.  An import ban on goods or services may give rise to a colorable claim 
of an indirect expropriation under an investment treaty and a quantitative restriction 
violation under GATT or a market access violation under GATS.37  The imposition of 
performance requirements may give rise to a TRIMs or a GATs claim and a BIT claim.38  
Rank protectionism may lead to a WTO national treatment claim or a BIT claim for fair 
 
35. Verhoosel, supra note 34, at 89. 
36. Robert Howse & Efraim Chalamish, The Use and Abuse of WTO Law in Investor-State 
Arbitration: A Reply to Jürgen Kurtz, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1087, 1094 (2009). 
37. See, e.g., GATT art. XI; GATS art.__NAFTA, art. 1110; Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/97/1,  NAFTA/UNICTRAL Trib., Award, ¶ 103 (Aug. 30, 2000),  40 ILM 36 (2001) 
(expropriation under Article 1110 includes “covert or incidental interference with the use of 
property which has the effect of depriving the owner, in whole or in part, of the use or reasonably-
to-be-expected economic benefit of property even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the 
host State.”) *Check article number with author. 
38. See, e.g., Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, art. II, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 186 (1995) 
[hereinafter TRIMs]; GATS arts. I, XVII; NAFTA art. 1106. *Is author referring to TRIM treaty or 
to the TRIP treaty? TRIM has not been introduced prior to this reference, either in the article or 
as a footnote. Double-check with the author. 
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and equitable treatment.39  Preferential treatment toward investors from a particular 
country may be prohibited by the MFN clauses in GATT, GATS, and BITs.40 
Such parallel proceedings have occurred on at least three occasions in recent years.  
With respect to the longstanding softwood lumber dispute between Canada and the 
United States, the WTO has addressed over half a dozen times the legality of United 
States tariff duties imposed on Canadian softwood lumber following highly contested 
domestic AD/CVD proceedings.41  Among the most controversial of the United States 
measures implicated in the softwood lumber dispute was the so-called “Byrd 
Amendment,”42 which earmarked collected AD/CVD tariff duties for distribution to 
domestic competitors.43   
While WTO proceedings were ongoing, Canadian softwood lumber producers brought 
investment arbitration claims against the United States alleging violations of NAFTA 
guarantees relating to national treatment, MFN, fair and equitable treatment, and 
expropriation.44  These investor claims were consolidated,45 and, with the exception of the 
Byrd Amendment, subsequently dismissed.46  The Byrd Amendment was subsequently 
 
39. See, e.g., GATT art. III; NAFTA art. 1105. 
40. See, e.g., GATT art. I; GATS art. II; NAFTA art. 1103. 
41. Appellate Body Report, United States—Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber from 
Canada, WT/DS264/AB/RW (Aug. 15, 2006); Appellate Body Report, United States—Investigation 
of the International Trade Commission in Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS277/AB/RW 
(Apr. 13, 2006); Appellate Body Report, United States—Final Countervailing Duty Determination 
With Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS257/AB/RW (Dec. 5, 2005); 
Appellate Body Report, United States—Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber from 
Canada, WT/DS264/AB/R (Aug. 11, 2004); Panel Report, United States—Investigation of the 
International Trade Commission in Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS277/R (Mar. 22, 2004); 
Appellate Body Report, United States—Final Countervailing Duty Determination With Respect to 
Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS257/AB/R (Jan. 19, 2004); Panel Report, United 
States—Preliminary Determinations with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, 
WT/DS236/R (Sept. 27, 2002). 
42. Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies 
Appropriations Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-387, §§ 1001–03, 114 Stat. 1549, 1549A-72 to 1549A-
75, repealed by Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 7601, 120 Stat. 4, 154.  See 
generally Tudor N. Rus, The Short, Unhappy Life of the Byrd Amendment, 10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & 
PUB. POL’Y 427 (2007); Claire Hervey, The Byrd Amendment Battle: American Trade Politics at the 
WTO, 27 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 131 (2003). 
43. Appellate Body Report, United States—Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, 
WT/DS217/AB/R, WT/DS234/AB/R (Jan. 16, 2003). 
44. Tembec, Inc. v. United States, NAFTA/UNICTRAL Trib., Notice of Arbitration and Statement 
of Claim (Dec. 3, 2004), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/27805.pdf; Terminal 
Forest Products Ltd. v. United States, NAFTA/UNICTRAL Trib., Notice of Arbitration (Mar. 
31, 2004), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/31360.pdf; Canfor Corp. v. United 
States, NAFTA/UNICTRAL Trib., Notice of Arbitration and Statement of Claim (July 9, 2002), 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/13203.pdf. 
45. Canfor Corp. et. al. v. United States, NAFTA/UNICTRAL Trib., Order of the Consolidation 
Tribunal, (Sept. 7, 2005), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/53113.pdf.  
46. The reason for the dismissal was because another NAFTA article was held to preclude 
investment claims over any AD/CVD matter. Canfor Corp. et. al. v. United States, 
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adjudicated before both the WTO and NAFTA tribunals.  The two tribunals reached 
contradictory results.  The NAFTA tribunal concluded that the Byrd Amendment was not 
a dumping and subsidies measure within the meaning of NAFTA,47 while the WTO 
Appellate Body concluded that it was a dumping and subsidies measure within the 
meaning of the WTO.48   
The Byrd Amendment was repealed in early 2006.49  In late 2006 Canada and the 
United States reached a political settlement through the signing of the Softwood Lumber 
Agreement (“SLA”) and, as a condition to the entry into force of the SLA, the NAFTA 
claims were subsequently dismissed.50  Consequently, the full effect of parallel 
proceedings and the conflicting results rendered by those tribunals was never realized.51 
The next major instance of parallel proceedings arose in the context of Mexican taxes 
and duties on various sweeteners.  One such measure was a twenty percent tax on soft 
drinks and other beverages that use a sweetener other than sugar.52  Mexico’s actions 
gave rise to litigation before the WTO and NAFTA Chapter 19, and investment 
arbitration under NAFTA Chapter 11.53   
 
NAFTA/UNICTRAL Trib., Decision on Preliminary Question, ¶¶ 188-273 (June 6, 2006) 
(addressing the jurisdictional limitations imposed by NAFTA, article 1091(3)), 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/67753.pdf; John Crook, Contemporary Practice 
of the United States Relating to International Law: NAFTA Panel Dismisses Chapter 11 
Challenges to U.S. Administration of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws, Allows 
Byrd Claim to Proceed, 101 AMER. J. INT’L L. 185, 222 (2007). 
47. Canfor Corp. et. al. v. United States, NAFTA/UNICTRAL Trib., Decision on Preliminary 
Question, ¶¶ 274-349 (June 6, 2006), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/67753.pdf.  A 
closer look suggests that the Byrd Amendment would have fallen within the definition of an 
AD/CVD measure within the meaning of NAFTA Article 1901(3) if the United States had followed 
the necessary procedural steps required by NAFTA Article 1901(2). See id. ¶ 334.  
48. Appellate Body Report, United States—Continued Dumping and Subsidies Offset Act of 2000, 
WT/DS217/AB/R, WT/DS234/AB/R, ¶¶ 240-42 (Jan. 16, 2003).   
49. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 7601, 120 Stat. 4, 154 (2006); see generally 
Rus, supra note 42, at 435-438.  
50. Softwood Lumber Agreement between Canada and the United States, U.S.-Can., art. II, Annex 
2A, Sept. 12, 2006, TIAS.  For a discussion of the parallel proceedings in the softwood lumber 
dispute, see Andrea Bjorklund, Private Rights and Public International Law:  Why Competition 
Among International Economic Law Tribunals is Not Working, 59 HASTINGS L. J.  241, 274-286 
(2007); Joost Pauwelyn, Adding Sweeteners to Softwood Lumber:  The WTO-NAFTA “Spaghetti 
Bowl” is Cooking, 9 J. INT’L ECON. L. 197, 197-205 (2006); Chi Carmody, Softwood Lumber Dispute 
(2001-2006), 100 AMER. J. INT’L L. 664 (2006). 
51. For a discussion of the parallel proceedings in the softwood lumber dispute, see Leonila Guglya, 
The Dispute Settlement Architecture of the Softwood Lumber Agreement 2006:  The Interplay of 
Dispute Resolution Mechanisms in the Late Phases of the Softwood Lumber Controversy, in 8 
TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. (SPECIAL ISSUE:  INTERSECTIONS:  DISSEMBLANCE OR CONVERGENCE 
BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT LAW) 3 (Sept. 2011). 
52. Appellate Body Report, Mexico—Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, 
WT/DS308/AB/R, ¶ 2 (Mar. 6, 2006). 
53. Appellate Body Report, Mexico—Anti-Dumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn Syrup 
(HFCS) from the United States, WT/DS132/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001); Panel Report, Mexico—Anti-
Dumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States, WT/DS132/R 
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The soft drink tax was imposed after Mexico repealed its unlawful antidumping 
duties, but the WTO Appellate Body found that the soft drink taxes violated WTO 
guarantees of national treatment and were not justified under any applicable exception.54  
The fact that the tax was imposed as a retaliatory countermeasure in response to the 
United States’ refusal to comply with its NAFTA obligations did not justify the measure 
under the WTO.55    
In the investment arbitration in Archer Daniels Midland v. Mexico, the tribunal ruled 
that the soft drink tax violated NAFTA investment provisions by imposing domestic 
performance requirements and violating national treatment obligations.56  It awarded 
$33 million in damages for these violations.57  Tribunals in the related cases of Corn 
Products v. Mexico and Cargill v. Mexico likewise found, inter alia, a NAFTA national 
treatment violation and awarded damages of $58.4 million and $77.3 million, 
respectively.58   
Mexico repealed the unlawful measures pursuant to a bilateral agreement between 
the United States and Mexico dated July 27, 2006.59  The agreement not only guaranteed 
U.S. sugar and corn sweetener producers with access to the Mexican market, but it also 
guaranteed reciprocal access by Mexican producers to the U.S. market.60  Had the WTO 
been the only forum to adjudicate the dispute, such prospective relief would have been 
the end of the matter.  But the successful pursuit of NAFTA investment claims confirmed 
the possibility that parallel proceedings may serve to achieve both prospective and 
retroactive relief, with foreign investors receiving almost $170 million in damages for 
injuries suffered as a result of Mexico’s unlawful taxes.61  In this respect parallel WTO 
and NAFTA proceedings complemented one another.   
In another sense, however, this dispute illustrates how WTO and NAFTA proceedings 
may be a source of conflict.  In all three NAFTA proceedings, Mexico argued that its 
 
(Jan. 28, 2000). 
54. Appellate Body Report, Mexico—Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, 
WT/DS308/AB/R, ¶¶ 58-84 (Mar. 6, 2006). 
55. Id. ¶¶ 79-80. 
56. Archer Daniels Midland Co. et al. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/05 (Nov. 
21, 2007). 
57. Id. ¶¶ 287-300. 
58. Corn Products International, Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/01 (Jan. 
15, 2008); Cargill, Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/05/2, Award, ¶ 559 
(Sept. 18, 2009).  
59. See Letter from Richard Crowder, Ambassador, US Trade Rep., to Lic. Angel Villalobos 
Rodriguez, Undersecretary, Int’l Trade Negotiations (Jul. 27, 2006) (archived at 
http://www.ustr.gov/archive/assets/Trade_Agreements/Regional/NAFTA/asset_upload_file694_
10810.pdf); Magda Kornis, U.S. Corn Sweeteners and Mexico Sugar:  Agreement at Last!, J. 
INT’L COMM. & ECON. 1 (Dec. 2006). 
60. Id. at 10. 
61. Chad Bond, NAFTA Update and Trade News Highlights from February 2011 through April 2011, 
17 L. & BUS. REV. OF THE AMERICAS 613, 613 (2011). 
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conduct was a legitimate countermeasure in response to United States’ international law 
violations.  That defense failed for reasons unique to the disputes, but the NAFTA 
tribunals clearly were sympathetic to foreign investors’ arguments that even legitimate 
countermeasures could give rise to investment claims, because BIT guarantees are owed 
to the investor, not the investors’ home State.62  The question thus arises whether the 
WTO may sanction retaliatory countermeasures for WTO violations, but foreign investors 
nonetheless may sue for any resulting injuries from such WTO-sanctioned 
countermeasures.  If so, then the most effective tool to secure compliance with WTO 
obligations may trigger investment arbitration.  Investment protections may limit a 
foreign investor’s exposure to retaliatory countermeasures imposed because its home 
country refuses to comply with WTO obligations.63  
The third significant example of parallel proceedings involves the recent filing of WTO 
and BIT claims relating to Australia’s Tobacco Plain Packaging Act (“PPA”).64  The 
Australian legislation prohibits the branding of tobacco products and regulates almost 
every aspect of the appearance, size and shape of tobacco packaging, with civil and 
criminal penalties for importing, packaging, or manufacturing non-compliant products.65 
Such measures have prompted both trade and investment litigation.  In the disputes 
now pending before the WTO, Ukraine, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic have 
argued, inter alia, that the PPA violated various TRIPs provisions by (1) unjustifiably 
encumbering the use of a trademark by special requirements, (2) preventing owners from 
enjoying the rights conferred by trademark, and (3) failing to provide effective protection 
against unfair competition with respect to geographic indications.66  
Meanwhile, Philip Morris has brought a BIT claim against Australia alleging the PPA 
constitutes an unlawful expropriation of its intellectual property, violates fair and 
 
62. Archer Daniels Midland v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/05, ¶¶ 128-151 
(Sept. 26, 2007); Corn Products International, Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/04/01, ¶¶ 144-191  (Jan. 15, 2008); Cargill, Inc. v. Mexico, Case No. ICSID 
ARB(AF)/05/2, ¶¶ 379-428 (Aug. 13, 2009).  See generally N. Jansen Calamita, Countermeasures 
and Jurisdiction: Between Effectiveness and Fragmentation, 42 GEO. J. INT’L L. 233, 246-253 
(2011). 
63. Luke Eric Peterson, Countermeasures Defence Raised in NAFTA Chapter 11 Claims Against 
Mexico, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW AND POLICY BLOG, 
http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2009/04/countermeasures-defence-raised-in-nafta-
chapter-11-claims-against-mexico.html (Apr. 13, 2009). 
64. Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011, (Austl.). 
65. Id. 
66. Request for Consultation by Honduras, Australia—Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, 
Geographical Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco 
Products and Packaging, WT/DS435/1 (Apr. 10, 2012); Request for Consultation by Honduras, 
Australia—Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, Geographical Indications and Other Plain 
Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, WT/DS435/1 (Apr. 10, 
2012); Request for Consultation by Ukraine, Australia—Certain Measures Concerning 
Trademarks and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and 
Packaging, WT/DS/434/1 (Mar. 15, 2012). 
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equitable treatment, guarantees of full protection and security, and umbrella clause 
guarantees.67  Australia, not surprisingly, denies the allegations.68   
While these international proceedings are ongoing, the tobacco industry has launched 
a third avenue of attack by pursuing litigation in Australian courts.  The Australian 
Supreme Court has already weighed in regarding the constitutionality of the PPA, 
finding that “the mere restriction on a right of property or even its extinction do not 
necessarily mean that a propriety right has been acquired by another.”69   
Trade and investment tribunals must now determine whether their rules protecting 
intellectual property rights can accommodate exceptions for health and public safety.70  
The WTO Agreements incorporate general exceptions necessary to protect human health 
and safety, but the Hong Kong-Australia BIT includes no such exception.71  The evidence 
to support the government’s health claims also will be tested, with the scientific 
standards in investment arbitration uncertain, while the WTO imposes stringent 
scientific standards to establish that plain packaging demonstrably alters consumer 
behavior.72   
 
67. Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Australia, Notice of Arbitration (Perm. Ct. Arb. Nov. 21, 2011), 
http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0665.pdf. 
68. Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Australia, Australia’s Response to the Notice of Arbitration, (Perm. Ct. 
Arb. Dec. 21, 2011), http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0666.pdf. 
69. JT International SA v. Commonwealth [2012] HCA 43, ¶ 357 (Austl.), available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2012/43.html. 
70. For a discussion of the likely success of the WTO case, see Tania S. Voon and Andrew D. 
Mitchell, Implications of WTO Law for Plain Packaging of Tobacco Products, in PUBLIC 
HEALTH AND PLAIN PACKAGING OF CIGARETTES LEGAL ISSUES (A. Mitchell, T. Voon, and J. 
Liberman, eds. 2012); Memorandum from Lalive to Philip Morris International Management 
SA (Jul. 23, 2009), (available at http://www.smoke-free.ca/plain-
packaging/documents/industry-responses/LALIVE_Analysis_23_July_2009.pdf; DANIEL 
GERVAIS, ANALYSIS OF THE COMPATIBILITY OF CERTAIN TOBACCO PRODUCT PACKAGING RULES 
WITH THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND THE PARIS CONVENTION (Nov. 30, 2010), http://www.smoke-
free.ca/trade-and-tobacco/Resources/Gervais.pdf.  For a discussion of the likely success of 
Philip Morris’ investment arbitration claim, Benn McGrady, Implications of Ongoing Trade 
and Investment Disputes Concerning Tobacco: Philip Morris v. Uruguay, in PUBLIC HEALTH 
AND PLAIN PACKAGING OF CIGARETTES LEGAL ISSUES (A. Mitchell, T. Voon, and J. Liberman, 
eds. 2012)); Luke Nottage, Consumer Product Safety Regulation and Investor-State Arbitration 
Policy and Practice After Philip Morris Asia v. Australia, 22 AUSTL. PRODUCTS LIABILITY REP. 
154 (2011), available at 
http://sydney.edu.au/law/scil/documents/2011/WP29_Nottage_Investor_APLR2011.pdf. 
71. Compare General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 art. XX(b), Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 
U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 [hereinafter GATT 1994] GATS art. XIV; TRIPs art. 20; H.K.-
Austl Bilateral Investment Treaty, Sept. 15, 1993, available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.hk/IPPAAustraliae.PDF. 
72. Regarding the disputed science behind plain packaging, compare compare Melanie Wakefield, et. 
al., Do Larger Pictorial Health Warnings Diminish the Need for Plain Packaging of Cigarettes, 107 
ADDICTION 1159 (2012) with Christopher Snowdown, Plain Packaging: Commercial Expression, 
Anti-Smoking Extremism, and the Risks of Hyper-Regulation, 13-22 (2012), 
http://www.adamsmith.org/research/reports/plain-packaging.  
12 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 35 (2013) 
50 
Parallel proceedings in the plain packaging context illustrate a willingness by 
multinational corporations to pursue all possible avenues of relief in response to onerous 
government regulation. Trade and investment litigation is a key part of that strategy.  
Philip Morris restructured its investment to capitalize on Hong Kong-Australia BIT 
protections, with Hong Kong-based Philip Morris Asia acquiring its interest in Philip 
Morris Australia in February 2011 after the plain packaging dispute arose.73  It also 
engaged in “diplomatic espousal shopping,” with the tobacco industry searching the globe 
for countries willing to initiate a WTO proceeding on its behalf, and funding countries 
like Ukraine, which has not exported tobacco to Australia in years, to litigate the WTO 
complaint.74 At a minimum litigation before international trade and investment tribunals 
may cause countries such as the EU, Canada and New Zealand to delay adopting their 
own plain packaging measures.  It also could increase the transaction costs of tobacco 
legislation.  It also could increase the transaction costs of tobacco legislation.  In the 
absence of stare decisis and non-mutual collateral estoppel in either trade litigation or 
investment arbitration, the tobacco industry can relitigate the same question again and 
again as each additional country adopts plain packaging legislation. 
V. Trade Remedies to Enforce Arbitration Awards 
One of the most significant developments signaling the convergence of trade and 
arbitration is the use of trade remedies to enforce arbitration awards.  This is done 
primarily when a developed country threatens to remove preferential trade benefits to a 
developing country if that country does not honor its international arbitration 
commitments. 
The WTO allows (but does not require) developed countries to grant preferential trade 
benefits to “promote the development, financial and trade needs of developing 
countries.”75  Many developed countries—including Australia, Canada, the European 
Union, and the United States—have established such “Generalized System of 
Preferences” or GSPs to promote trade with developing countries.76  The major benefit of 
 
73. Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Australia, Australia’s Response to the Notice of Arbitration, (Dec. 21, 
2011), ¶¶ 29-31 http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0666.pdf. 
74. Tim Colebatch, Plain Packaging Challenge Spreads, THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Jul. 20, 
2012; Christopher Thompson, Big Tobacco Backs Australian Law Opposers, FINANCIAL TIMES, 
Apr. 29, 2012. 
75. This exception to normal Most-Favored-Nation status is pursuant to the so-called Enabling 
Clause adopted by GATT Contracting Parties in 1980 and carried forward with GATT 1994.  See 
Decision of the Panel, Differential and More Favourable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller 
Participation of Developing Countries, L/4903 (Nov. 28 1979), GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 203, 
art. 3(c), (1980); GATT 1994 para. 1(b)(iv) consists, inter alia, of other decisions of the Contracting 
Parties to GATT 1947). 
76. See UNCTAD, Generalized System of Preferences (2012), http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DITC/GSP/ 
Generalized-System-of-Preferences.aspx. 
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GSP schemes is the unilaterally lowering of tariff bowers for products from beneficiary 
countries without a corresponding reduction in tariffs for the developed country’s 
products. 
The discretionary nature of these schemes means that the trade benefits come with 
strings attached.  In the United States and the European Union, for example, developing 
countries are subject to performance obligations with respect to matters such as drug 
trafficking, international terrorism, democracy, human rights, environmental protection, 
government corruption, unlawful expropriation, the rule of law, and good governance.77   
The United States imposes a number of conditions on beneficiary countries, including 
that they recognize and enforce arbitral awards in favor of United States nationals.78  
Any country that wishes to secure beneficiary status under the GSP scheme must satisfy 
this criterion,79 and any country that fails to maintain this commitment jeopardizes their 
beneficiary status.  The provision was added to the Trade Act of 197480 because of 
concerns that it was “contrary to sound U.S. policy to give…any… developing nation the 
favored treatment contemplated by the present legislation in the face of unwillingness to 
abide by solemn agreements to recognize as final and binding arbitration awards 
rendered in disputes between it and American parties.”81 
The use of trade remedies to enforce arbitration awards is best illustrated by the 
ongoing dispute over Argentina’s refusal to honor adverse investment awards.  On March 
26, 2012, the Obama Administration announced that Argentina’s GSP beneficiary 
designation would be suspended “because it has not acted in good faith in enforcing 
arbitral awards in favor of United States citizens.”82  It was the first time in American 
 
77. See, e.g., Trade Act of 1974 § 502, 19 U.S.C. § 2462 (2006) (enumerating criteria for designation as 
a GSP beneficiary status); EU Council Regulation 978/2012, art. 9, 2012 O.J. (L 303) 1 (EC) 
(establishing criteria for designation as beneficiary country based on commitments to human 
rights, the environment, drug-trafficking, and corruption).  
78. 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(2)(E) (2006) (“The President shall not designate any country a beneficiary 
developing country under this subchapter if … such country fails to act in good faith in recognizing 
as binding or in enforcing arbitral awards in favor of United States citizens or a corporation, 
partnership, or association … which have been made by arbitrators appointed for each case or by 
permanent arbitral bodies to which the parties involved have submitted their dispute.”); see also 
19 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(3) (2006) (same requirement with respect to benefits under the Caribbean 
Basin Initiative); 19 U.S.C. § 3202(3) (2006) (same requirement with respect to benefits under the 
Andean Trade Preference Act). 
79. See, e.g., Generalized System of Preferences (GSP); Initiation of a Review to Consider the 
Designation of Nigeria as a Beneficiary Developing Country Under the GSP; Solicitation of Public 
Comments relating to the Designation Criteria, 65 Fed. Reg. 25972 (May 4, 2000); Generalized 
System of Preferences (GSP); Initiation of a Review to Consider the Designation of Mongolia as a 
Beneficiary Developing Country Under the GSP; Solicitation of Public Comments relating to the 
Designation Criteria, 64 Fed. Reg. 3736 (Jan. 25, 1999). 
80. TRADE ACT OF 1974, CONFERENCE. REPORT, H. REP. NO. 93-1644, at 52-53 (Dec. 19, 1974). 
81. 120 CONG. REC. 39,831 (Dec. 13, 1974) (statement of Sen. Robert Taft); see generally Charles B. 
Rosenberg, The Intersection of International Trade and International Arbitration:  The Use of 
Trade Benefits to Secure Compliance with Arbitral Awards, 44 GEO. J. INT'L. L. 503 (2013). 
82. To Modify Duty-Free Treatment Under the Generalized System of Preferences and for Other 
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history the United States denied GSP trade benefits to a developing country for its 
failure to honor arbitration commitments.83  “A remarkable achievement,” is how one 
senior USTR official described the development.84 
The decision was the culmination of an intense lobbying effort by American 
corporations who had succeeded in arbitration against Argentina pursuant to the United 
States-Argentina Bilateral Investment Treaty, but were unsuccessful in securing 
enforcement of those awards.85  The threat to suspend GSP benefits became a matter of 
intense bilateral concern.  When President Barack Obama and Argentine President 
Christine Fernandez met for the first time in November 2011, the two heads of state 
spent the majority of their time discussing Argentina’s obligation to pay the arbitration 
awards, and the consequences that would flow from its failure to do so.86   
The United States is clearly calculating that such trade sanctions will alter 
Argentina’s cost-benefit analysis.87  Buenos Aires is set to pay approximately $18 million 
annually in increased duties as a result of the GSP suspension, far below the $300 
million it owes from the arbitration awards.88  Standing alone, the GSP suspension may 
be an insufficient incentive to comply given that the annual cost in additional duties 
 
Purposes, Proclamation No. 8788, 77 Fed. Reg. 18,899 (Mar. 26, 2012).   
83. US Suspends Special Tariffs for Argentina, BBC NEWS, (Mar. 26, 2012, 13:23 ET), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-17517838. 
84. Jonathan S. Kallmer, former Deputy Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Investment, 
Using International Trade Law to Enforce International Arbitration Awards, (Nov. 29, 2012), 
http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/events/details.cfm?eventCD=121310IDR.  
85. GSP: 2009 ANNUAL REVIEW, Petition for Review of the Republic of Argentina’s Eligibility under 
GSP by Azurix Corp. (Dec. 4, 2009) available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-topics/trade-
development/preference-programs/generalized-system-preference-gsp/current-review-1.; GSP: 
2010 ANNUAL REVIEW, Petition for the Withdrawal of the Application of Duty-Free Treatment to 
Articles of Argentina by Blue Ridge Investments, L.L.C. (June 23, 2010) available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/node/6058; see generally Nigel Blackaby, Partner, Freshfields Bruckhaus 
Deringer, Using International Trade Law to Enforce International Arbitration Awards, (Nov. 29, 
2012), 
http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/events/event_Detail.cfm?eventCD=121310IDR&isPackage=0&s
howAllButtons=1.  
86. Daniel Restrepo, Remarks at the University of Pennsylvania School of Law Symposium (Nov. 2, 
2012) (https://www.law.upenn.edu/journals/jil/agenda2012.php); US: Obama-CFK Meeting 
“Warm,” but Argentina Must Cancel Debt, BUENOS AIRES HERALD (Nov. 9, 2011) available at 
http://www.buenosairesherald.com/article/84136/us-calls-obamacfk-meeting-warm-but-says-
argentina-must-cancel-debt.  
87. Press Release, U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk, Comments on Presidential Actions Related to 
the Generalized System of Preferences, Office of the United States Trade Representative (Mar. 
2012) available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2012/march/us-trade-
representative-ron-kirk-comments-presidenti (expressing the hope that Argentina would pay the 
awards, allowing “us to consider reinstating Argentina’s eligibility and promote the growth of a 
mutually beneficial U.S.-Argentina trade and investment relationship.”). 
88. Doug Palmer, Obama Says to Suspend Trade Benefits for Argentina, REUTERS, (Mar. 26, 2012, 
3:40 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/26/us-usa-argentina-trade-
idUSBRE82P0QX20120326; United States Suspends Special Tariffs for Argentina, BBC NEWS, 
(Mar. 26, 2012 13:23 ET) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-17517838. 
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represents only six percent of one arbitration award.  But when the trade sanctions are 
considered in the context of other measures—such as limiting access to World Bank and 
Inter-American Development Bank credit and loan facilities or refusing to support the 
restructuring of Argentina’s $7 billion Paris Club debt—the combined result may nudge 
Argentina toward compliance, or at least a post-award settlement.89  The combined 
approach exposes Argentina to substantial risks, such as limiting its access to credit, 
altering its credit rating, constricting its export market, and discouraging foreign 
investment.    
With the successful campaign to suspend Argentina’s GSP benefits, U.S. corporations 
are now actively pursuing a similar tactic with respect to other countries.  Chevron, in 
particular, is lobbying the United States Trade Representative to suspend Ecuador’s 
preferential trade status under the Andean Trade Preference Act (“ATPA”)90 because of 
that country’s failure to honor arbitration awards in Chevron’s favor.  USTR has warned 
that Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa that he is in jeopardy of losing ATPA 
beneficiary status.91  Ecuador is particularly vulnerable to losing its beneficiary status 
because the other three ATPA beneficiary countries have already, or soon will no longer 
be part of the program.92  The ATPA is unlikely to remain with Ecuador as the sole 
beneficiary.93 
Thus far proposed trade remedies to enforce arbitration awards have come in the 
modest form of removing preferential trade benefits.  If that approach proves 
unsuccessful, the United States could consider more drastic measures—such as Section 
301 trade remedies.94  In 2011 Azurix filed a Section 301 petition, arguing that 
Argentina’s refusal to pay the ICSID award constitutes an unjustifiable measure that 
burdens U.S. commerce within the meaning of Section 301.95   
 
89. Rosenberg, supra note 81, at 517; Jorge E. Viñuales & Dolores Bentolila, The Use of 
Alternative (Non-Judicial Means) to Enforce Investment Awards Against States, in  
DIPLOMATIC AND JUDICIAL MEANS OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (L. Boisson de Chazournes,et al. 
eds., 2012). 
90. Andean Trade Preference Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3201-3206. 
91. United States Trade Representative, Sixth Report to the Congress on the Operation of the Andean 
Trade Preferences Act as Amended, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE 25 
(June 30, 2012), http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/3488.  
92. Bolivia lost its beneficiary status in 2009, Peru graduated from the program in 2010, and 
Colombia will no longer be part of the program with the entry into force of the United States-
Colombia Trade Program Agreement Implementation Act. See Proclamation No. 8323, 73 Fed. 
Reg. 72,677 (Nov. 25, 2008) (removing Bolivia as an ATPA beneficiary country); Andean Trade 
Preference Act (ATPA): Notice Regarding the 2012 Annual Review, 77 Fed. Reg. 47,910 (Aug. 10, 
2012) (“[a]s of May 15, 2012, with the entry into force of the CTPA [United States-Colombia Trade 
Program Agreement Implementation Act], only Ecuador remained eligible for benefits under the 
program”); See Restrepo, supra note 86; Rosenberg, supra note 81, at 528-29. 
93. Restrepo, supra note 86. 
94. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (regarding the consistency of Section 301 trade remedies with the WTO); Panel 
Report, United States—Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999). 
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The USTR has been reluctant to accept Section 301 petitions when an investor alleges 
that a host country has expropriated its investment, reasoning that such claims should 
be pursued in investment arbitration.96  But if an investor successfully pursues 
arbitration and still is unable to collect against the host country, the justification for 
pursuing a Section 301 action is enhanced.97  The overwhelming majority of Section 301 
cases are concerned with foreign trade practices that impede exports or impose 
impediments to U.S. investments abroad.98  Section 301 measures almost always are 
designed with the same objectives as bilateral investment treaties:  to benefit the U.S. 
economy by promoting trade, foreign investment and export opportunities.  Therefore, a 
Section 301 action for refusing to recognize and enforce an arbitration award is plausible. 
It is also possible that the United States could consider more draconian unilateral 
remedies to pressure Argentina to comply with its obligations.  Such measures may 
include seizing assets, denying access to capital markets, imposing import bans, or 
retaliatory tariffs against Argentine products.  For example, proposed legislation in the 
112th Congress would have required the Securities and Exchange Commission to take all 
necessary measures to deny any “judgment evading foreign state” or state-owned 
corporation thereof from access to United States capital markets, including the ability to 
borrow money or sell securities in the United States.99  The purpose of such legislation, 
according to its principal sponsor, was stop Argentina—“one of the largest scofflaws in 
history” that shows “equal disregard for both U.S. and international law”—from 
“inflicting further financial injury on the United States and its citizens.”100    
To the extent such measures would violate WTO trade rules—by imposing 
discriminatory internal regulations—the United States could argue that they are 
permitted under a WTO general exception.  Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994 allows 
Member States to take measures that are “necessary to secure compliance with laws or 
regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement….”101  The 
 
TRADE (Aug. 12, 2011), http://wtonewsstand.com/component/option,com_ppv/Itemid,445/ 
id,2372728/; Doug Palmer, U.S. Firm Eyes Trade Case to Enforce Argentina Payment, REUTERS, 
(Aug. 8, 2011 5:48 PM) http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/08/usa-argentina-dispute-
idUSN1E7770XN20110808.; Arthur E. Appelton, Forum Selection in Trade Litigation, ICTSD 
PROGRAMME ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW (April 2013), 
http://ictsd.org/downloads/2013/04/forum-selection-in-trade-litigation.pdf. 
96. Petition Under 302 on Alleged Expropriations by the Dominican Republic, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,857 
(July 15, 2011). 
97. See Kallmer, supra note 84. 
98. Alan O. Sykes, Constructive Unilateral Threats in International Commercial Relations: The 
Limited Case for Section 301, 23 L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 263, 264-65 (1992). 
99. S. 912, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011); H.R. 1798, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011). 
100. Rep. Connie Mack, U.S., Obama Must Hold Argentina Accountable, ROLL CALL, (Nov. 9, 2011), 
http://www.rollcall.com/issues/57_56/connie_mack_us_obama_must_hold_argentina_accountable-
210136-1.html. 
101. GATT, Art. XX(d). See Appellate Body Report, Korea- Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, 
Chilled, and Frozen Beef, ¶157, WT/DS161/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000) (“[f]or a measure, otherwise 
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WTO would not permit a measure that simply sought Argentina’s compliance with its 
ICSID obligations.102  The “laws or regulations” contemplated by Article XX(d) refers to 
“rules that form part of the domestic legal system of a WTO member,” not “obligations of 
another WTO member under an international agreement.”103  To the extent ICSID 
awards are part of domestic United States law, measures necessary to secure such 
compliance with those awards would arguably fall within Article XX(d). 
Federal legislation implementing the ICSID Convention provides that an ICSID 
award “shall create a right arising under a treaty of the United States” and that the 
“pecuniary obligations imposed by such an award shall be enforced and shall be given the 
same full faith and credit as if the award were a final judgment of a court of general 
jurisdiction of one of the several States.”104  Thus, ICSID awards become enforceable 
domestic judgments in the United States by virtue of 22 U.S.C. § 1650a.  Accordingly, 
compliance with an ICSID award is not simply a question of international law; it is also a 
matter of federal law placing ICSID awards on the same footing as domestic court 
judgments.   
If the United States takes WTO-inconsistent action to pressure Argentina into 
compliance, it can credibly argue that enforcement of judgments is a legitimate state 
objective and that, having failed to collect on the judgments using alternative means, 
unilateral trade measures are necessary to secure compliance with WTO-consistent 
federal law. 
VI. Investment Arbitration to Enforce Trade Obligations 
Recourse to trade remedies to pursue the enforcement of arbitration awards is a 
present reality.  In the future, the convergence of trade and arbitration may include 
recourse to investment arbitration to enforce international trade guarantees.  
Specifically, umbrella clauses in bilateral investment treaties are being invoked to 
enforce investment commitments in trade agreements. 
There is extensive commentary on the meaning of umbrella clauses in BITs, with 
particular focus on whether contract rights give rise to investment claims.105  Less 
 
inconsistent with GATT 1994, to be justified provisionally under paragraph (d) of Article XX, two 
elements must be shown.  First, the measure must be one designed to ‘secure compliance’ with 
laws or regulations that are not themselves inconsistent with some provision of the GATT 1994.  
Secondly, the measure must be ‘necessary’ to secure such compliance.”). 
102. Appellate Body Report, Mexico—Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, ¶69, 
WT/DS308 /AB/R (Mar. 6, 2006).  
103. Id. 
104. 22 U.S.C. § 1650a. 
105. See, e.g., JAN OLE VOSS, THE IMPACT OF INVESTMENT TREATIES ON CONTRACTS BETWEEN HOST 
STATES AND FOREIGN INVESTORS 221-276 (2011); JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT 
TREATIES, 271-284 (2010); STEPHAN W. SCHILL, Umbrella Clauses as Public Law Concepts in 
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common in the scholarly literature is whether a State’s other investment commitments 
give rise to a BIT claim.106  There is virtually no discussion as to whether WTO 
commitments, including provisions of the TRIMs Agreement, constitute an investment 
obligation within the meaning of BIT umbrella clauses.   
The scope of umbrella clauses is dependent on the language in particular BITs, which 
varies widely from one treaty to the next.  Accordingly, there is no uniform 
understanding as to the meaning of umbrella clauses.  Narrow umbrella clauses are 
unlikely vehicles for vindicating international trade rights.  A treaty commitment to 
observe any obligation a Contracting State “has assumed with regard to specific 
investments” is unlikely to encompass legislative measures or treaty commitments.107  
Broad umbrella clauses, by contrast, committing a Contracting Party to observe any 
obligation it may have entered into with regard to investments are better candidates.108 
ICSID tribunals have interpreted broad umbrella clauses to give investors treaty 
rights with respect to unilateral undertakings of the State embodied in municipal law.109  
In CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, the tribunal concluded that utility tariffs 
designed to attract foreign investment were “legal … obligations pertinent to the 
investment.”110  In LGE v. Argentina, the tribunal concluded that abrogation of 
 
(Stephan W. Schill, ed. 2010); Clauses as Public Law Concepts in Comparative Perspective, in 
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ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUÍS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES: 
STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 436-478 (2009); RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES 
OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 153, 162 (2008); Jarrod Wong, Umbrella Clauses in Bilateral 
Investment Treaties: Of Breaches of Contract, Treaty Violations, and the Divide between 
Developing and Developed Countries in Foreign Investment Disputes, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 135 
(2006).  
106. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 105, at 456-459; SASSON, supra note 105, at 193-94; MARÍA 
CRISTINA GRITÓN SALIAS, Do Umbrella Clauses Apply to Unilateral Undertakings, in 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH 
SCHREUER 490 (Christina Binder et al., eds. 2009). 
107. For example, in SGS v. Philippines an ICSID tribunal interpreted the language of the 
Switzerland-Philippines BIT, which required each Contracting Party to “observe any obligation it 
has assumed with regard to specific investments in its territory by investors of the other 
Contracting Party,” as limited to specific contractual commitments rather than legal obligations of 
a general character. See, SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Phil., ICSID 
Case No. ARB/02/6, ¶115-126, (Jan. 29, 2004). 
108. Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award, Art.II, (Oct. 12, 2005) 
(interpreting the United States-Romania BIT, which provides that “[e]ach Party shall observe any 
obligation it may have entered into with regard to investments.”); Société Général de Surveillance 
S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, Decision of the Tribunal on 
Objections to Jurisdiction, (Apr. 6, 2003) (interpreting Switzerland-Pakistan BIT, which provides 
that “[e]ach Contracting Party shall constantly guarantee the observance of commitments it has 
entered into with respect to the investments or the investors of the other Contracting Party.”). 
109. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 105, at 456-459. 
110. CMS Gas Tranmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, ¶303 (May 
12, 2005). 
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guarantees made to investors in a statutory framework gave rise to liability under the 
umbrella clause.111  In Enron v. Argentina, another tribunal concluded that the umbrella 
clause referred to “any obligations regardless of their nature.”112  This included not only 
contractual obligations, but also “obligations assumed through law or regulation” that 
are “with regard to investments.”113  In Sempra Energy International v. Argentina, a 
tribunal found that major legal and regulatory changes introduced by the State as part of 
its public function constituted treaty violations under the umbrella clause.114  Finally, in 
SGS v. Paraguay, a tribunal interpreted a broad umbrella clause as creating “an 
obligation for the State to constantly guarantee observance of its commitments entered 
into with respect to investments of investors of the other party.  The obligation has no 
limitations on its face—it apparently applies to all such commitments, whether 
established by contract or by law, unilaterally or bilaterally.”115   
Note that these sweeping pronouncements do not require that a State’s commitment 
reference a specific investment or contract.  As long as legislative or executive measures 
relate to the promotion or regulation of investments, they constitute unilateral 
undertakings covered by a broad umbrella clause.  Such ICSID jurisprudence has led one 
commentator to conclude that “tribunals overwhelmingly accept the application of 
umbrella clauses to obligations assumed unilaterally by host States,” whether those 
undertakings are “made through legislation or otherwise.”116  Another has opined that 
“the current tide of jurisprudence concerning umbrella clauses is in favor of such clauses 
encompassing host State commitments of all kinds.”117   
Assuming such interpretations are correct—which is by no means clear—this has 
significant implications for the WTO.   If WTO obligations are subject to investment 
arbitration, it would authorize private parties to initiate trade cases.  Private rights of 
action through investment arbitration would supplement the diplomatic espousal of 
claims before the WTO.   
This is precisely what one foreign investor has argued with respect to alleged WTO 
violations as a result of Australia’s plain-packaging laws.  On November 21, 2011, Philip 
Morris Asia Ltd. filed an investment arbitration claim against Australia pursuant to the 
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Hong Kong-Australia Bilateral Investment Treaty.  The central contention of Philip 
Morris is that Australia’s plain packaging legislation violated various international 
obligations.  Among the claims it filed is one under the broad “umbrella clause” in the 
BIT, which provides that “[e]ach Contracting Party shall observe any obligation it may 
have entered into with regard to investments of investors of the other Contracting 
Party.”118 According to the Notice of Arbitration: 
This [umbrella clause] obligation is broader than specific obligations … made by 
the host State to investors….  It also encompasses other international obligations 
binding on the host State that affect the way in which property is treated in 
Australia….  [T]he relevant obligations are those enshrined in TRIPS, the Paris 
Convention, and TBT.  [Claimant] as an owner of the investments is entitled to 
expect Australia to comply with its obligations pursuant to those treaties.  By 
adopting and implementing plain packaging legislation, Australia has failed to 
observe and abide by those obligations.”119 
In response, Australia argued that: 
The meaning and scope of such provisions is a matter of great controversy.  
However it is clear in the instant case that … the “umbrella clause” in Article 2(2) 
cannot be understood as encompassing general obligations in multilateral 
treaties….  Rather … the “umbrella clause” … only covers commitments that a host 
State has entered into with respect to specific investments….  [T]he obligations 
under the multilateral treaties … are not “obligations” which have been entered 
into with regard to investments of investors” of Hong Kong, but are rather 
obligations that operate on the inter-State level, with their own particular inter-
State dispute resolution procedures.120 
It is too early to assess the likely success of such claims, but if the recent “umbrella 
clause” jurisprudence is accurate the claims are at least colorable. 
Whether WTO commitments are obligations with regard to investments is a difficult 
question.  At one level, the entire WTO regime is intended, according to the Marrakesh 
Declaration, to “lead to more … investment … throughout the world.”121 Therefore 
virtually all WTO commitments will influence investment climates and investor decisions 
in some form.122  At another level, one can identify specific WTO commitments in TRIMs, 
 
118. Agreement between the Government of Hong Kong and the Government of Australia for the 
Promotion and Protection of Investments, H.K.-Austl., Sept. 15, 1993, 1770 U.N.T.S. 386, 
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119. Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Australia, Notice of Arbitration, ¶¶7.15-7.17 (Perm. Ct. Arb. Nov. 
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58 (Perm. Ct. Arb. Dec. 21, 2011), http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
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121. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, art.1 Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 
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122. Pierre Sauvé, A First Look at Investment in the Final Act of the Uruguay Round, in 
GLOBALIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT, 241, 242, n.1 (Fiona Beveridge ed., 2005). 
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TRIPs, and GATs that provide significant investment protections.123  To the extent that 
umbrella clause commitments extend to unilateral investment undertakings, at least 
some WTO commitments implemented in domestic legislation would satisfy the 
investment nexus.         
This potential convergence of trade and arbitration has profound implications for the 
resolution of WTO violations.  An arbitration panel liberally construing a broad umbrella 
clause could transform how WTO obligations are adjudicated.  How would the 
adjudication of WTO obligations through investment arbitration alter the landscape?     
First, umbrella clauses in BITs could create a private right of action for resolving 
WTO disputes.  Investment arbitration circumvents the traditional barriers to initiating 
a WTO dispute.  Diplomatic espousal is no longer a reliable check on the pursuit of 
unmeritorious claims.  Through umbrella clauses foreign investors could seek recourse 
for violations of investment obligations that form part of WTO disciplines. 
Second, with WTO dispute settlement the Member States control all decisions with 
respect to adjudication and resolution of the dispute.  Investors may prefer an alternative 
dispute settlement process that places such decisions within their control.  The incentives 
to settle an investment dispute depend on satisfying investors concerns rather than 
satisfying the disputing Member States’ concerns. 
Third, with limited exceptions, the WTO prohibits unilateral trade remedies.  Article 
23 of the DSU provides that Member States “shall not make a determination to the effect 
that a violation has occurred … except through recourse to dispute settlement in 
accordance with the rules and procedures of this Understanding.”124  Investment 
arbitration is not a unilateral remedy imposed in response to a WTO violation, but 
neither is it WTO dispute settlement.  Investment arbitration may provide a vehicle for 
compensating or attenuating the harm caused to investors without offending the WTO 
restrictions on unilateral trade remedies. 
Fourth, WTO remedies are prospective, while investment arbitration remedies may be 
retroactive.  The goal of the WTO adjudication is to bring Member States into conformity 
with their trade obligations.125  The goal of investment arbitration is, consistent with 
traditional understandings of state responsibility, to “wipe-out all the consequences of 
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124. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 23(2)(a), 
Apr. 15, 1994 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 
1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU]. 
125. DSU art. 19(1), 22.  
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the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed 
if that act had not been committed.”126 
Fifth, under the WTO dispute settlement process, any losses an investor suffers as a 
result of a Member State’s WTO violation are not compensable.  WTO remedies 
contemplate compensation directly to a Member State or, failing that, the suspension of 
concessions paid directly to the Member State in the form of increased duties.127  With 
investment arbitration, international law violations result in monetary compensation due 
directly to the investor. 
Thus, liberal interpretations of broad umbrella clauses that encompass investment 
commitments in WTO undertakings may prove to be an attractive avenue for future 
investment arbitration. 
VII. Conclusion 
The WTO and BITs are among the most significant legal developments in the history 
of international economic law.  Never before in the history of international relations has 
trade and investment been supported by such powerful legal guarantees and adjudicative 
processes.  In less than two decades the WTO and BITs have permanently altered the 
legal landscape with reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements designed to 
reduce barriers to trade and investment and eliminate discriminatory treatment in 
international economic relations.   
In most respects the worlds of trade and investment are on parallel tracks headed in 
the same direction.  The ends are similar, but the means toward those ends are distinct.  
The purpose of this essay has been to highlight discrete areas where a convergence of the 
two disciplines is emerging.  These points of convergence are limited, but significant.   
The first point of convergence highlights the mutually reinforcing nature of trade and 
investment.  The guarantees in BITs and the WTO are baseline protections that reflect 
international minimum standards that nations accord to every other trading partner.  
Preferential trade agreements with investment chapters promote deep vertical 
integration and efficient global production lines by minimizing trade costs, maximizing 
market access, and harmonizing cross-border regulatory standards.  The convergence of 
trade and investment in deep PTAs is a reflection of the modern era of globalized chains 
of supply.   
The second point of convergence emphasizes the unifying commitment in both trade 
and investment regimes against discrimination and protectionism.  While the WTO 
 
126. Factory at Chorzow (Ger. v. Pol.) 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 47 (Sept. 13); Draft Articles on 
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the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act.”). 
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focuses on non-discrimination with respect to like products and services, BITs focus on 
non-discrimination with respect to the regulation of similarly-situated foreign and 
domestic investors.  Despite the textual differences, in no other area of law has WTO 
jurisprudence influenced the resolution of investment claims more than with respect to 
BIT national treatment guarantees. 
Given the similarities between trade and investment guarantees, the same factual 
scenario may give rise to both WTO and BIT adjudication.  Thus far we have seen such 
parallel proceedings in less than a handful of cases, but the proliferation of BITs and BIT 
investment arbitration will increase such opportunities.  There is an obvious symmetry 
between the two types of proceedings, with one looking forward and the other looking 
backward.128  It should surprise no one that multinational corporations will pursue 
investment claims before an arbitration forum created by States to promote the national 
interest, while States determine that it is in the national interest to pursue a parallel 
WTO claim.  
The most innovative examples of the convergence between trade and arbitration are 
with respect to the last two developments, both of which suggest that the two regimes are 
mutually reinforcing.  Investment arbitration was designed in a manner such that 
recognition and enforcement of adverse investment awards was presumed.129  That is not 
how things have played out, and the Argentina kerfuffle suggests that foreign investors 
increasingly may pursue trade remedies to secure enforcement of investment arbitration 
awards.  Conversely, the WTO was designed so that, with limited exceptions, trade 
disputes would be resolved before the WTO dispute settlement body.  But liberal 
interpretations of broad umbrella clauses may afford foreign investors the opportunity to 
adjudicate investment commitments embedded in the WTO agreements before BIT 
tribunals.  With these two developments we may see a future in which trade remedies 
reinforce investment guarantees, and investment remedies reinforce trade guarantees. 
The broader implications of this convergence between trade and investment 
arbitration remain unclear.  Much depends on the frequency with which these points of 
convergence occur.  With one exception—preferential trade agreements with investment 
 
128. See Brooks E. Allen, The Use of Non-Pecuniary Remedies in WTO Dispute Settlement: Lessons for 
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chapters—convergence is an infrequent and occasional event.  Investment tribunals 
occasionally have relied on WTO jurisprudence, but the WTO dispute settlement body 
almost never relies on investment tribunal jurisprudence.130  Parallel trade and 
investment proceedings have occurred on only three occasions, even though there have 
been over 450 WTO complaints filed,131 over 180 WTO panel reports issued,132 and over 
388 concluded or pending ICSID cases.133  One cannot make too much of parallel 
proceedings if they occur in less than one percent of all trade or investment disputes.  
Recourse to trade remedies in order to enforce arbitration awards is a new development 
and only time will tell whether the Argentina scenario is sui generis.  Foreign investors 
have relied on umbrella clauses to enforce investment commitments in trade agreements, 
but no investment tribunal has ruled to that effect. 
The convergence of trade and investment has taken hold with investment chapters in 
preferential trade agreements.  Convergence of the two disciplines with respect to 
dispute resolution is a nascent development.  To the extent convergence occurs with 
greater frequency, we may soon call it a trend.  Scholars today are actively encouraging 
broad and deep convergence of the two disciplines.134  Perhaps further convergence will 
portend a future unified international economic law.135  
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Finally, the convergence of trade and investment raises broader theoretical questions.  
Numerous actors have pursued the various convergences outlined in this essay: 
diplomats, bureaucrats, corporations, adjudicators, practitioners, and scholars.  Typically 
they are not concerned with theoretical questions of global constitutionalism, 
fragmentation, incoherence, or cosmopolitan community.  For them, international law is 
not a progressive, liberal project; it is a vehicle to solve real-world problems.  How can we 
protect globalized chains of supply?  How can we open foreign markets for our 
constituents?  How should we interpret ambiguous text in a treaty?  How can we secure 
compensation for past harm and prevent future harm?  How can we exert sufficient 
economic pressure to force a recalcitrant party to recognize an award?  How can we 
prevent a government from regulating away our intellectual property? 
When actors seek to engage such problems, they are willing to use every tool 
available, regardless of the label.  This practical reality raises important theoretical 
questions.  International trade and investment law reflect institutional manifestations of 
structural bias, and a choice to pursue one avenue or the other creates path dependency.  
Defining a problem as a trade dispute or an investment dispute is a strategic decision, 
allowing the expert to refer to a “technical idiom so as to open the door for applying the 
expertise related to that idiom, together with the attendant structural bias.”136  Powerful 
interest groups will attempt to define the problem in a way that furthers their interests, 
and will invoke whatever language is necessary.  Fragmentation and convergence both 
present opportunities and obstacles. 
For such actors, international law is not “a kind of secular faith,” a “placeholder for 
the vocabularies of justice and goodness.”137  Rather, international law regimes are 
utilitarian constructs, necessary expedients to achieve a desired end.  Regime 
convergence occasionally furthers those ends.  The fact that these regimes are perceived 
as effective to achieve the desired ends speaks volumes about the relevance of 
international law.     
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